Reprimanding the Haryana government for its decision to involve the central government in matters concerning the promotion of additional district and sessions judges (ADJs) in the state, the Supreme Court noted that such actions exceeded the scope of consultation outlined with the high court.
The Supreme Court held that “the state government travelled beyond the remit of the consultation with the high court by referring the matter to the Union government.”
In a detailed judgment, the top court emphasised that any disagreements between the high court and the state government should have been resolved through their mutual consultation process.
The dispute arose when the state government and the Punjab and Haryana High Court clashed over the elevation of 13 civil judges to district judges. Subsequently, the state government sought the opinion of the Union Ministry of Law and Justice, which aligned with the state”s stance. Consequently, the Haryana government declined to notify the list of promoted judges approved by the High Court.
In delineating the constitutional framework governing the appointment of district judges, a bench headed by Chief Justice DY Chandrachud underscored that the state government was obligated to consult solely with the High Court in this matter. The bench also referenced previous Supreme Court judgments that offered further clarity on the required consultative procedure during such appointments.
The Supreme Court’s verdict stemmed from an appeal against the Punjab and Haryana High Court”s ruling in December 2023, which directed the state government to take action on the High Court’s recommendation for promoting civil judges. This appeal was filed by an candidate who had failed to secure a place on the merit list of judges cleared for promotion.
The High Court upheld the criteria established for the promotion of civil judges through an administrative process, affirming that the recommendations for promotions fell within the administrative domain of the High Court.
The petitioner’s argument before the Supreme Court was centered on the contention that the High Court should not have established distinct requirements for the three different recruitment methods for the same position of a district judge.
While 25 percent of the positions are allocated to direct entrants from the legal profession, who are selected following successful completion of an examination, the remaining 75 percent are filled through in-service candidates. Among these, civil judges promoted based on merit-cum-seniority occupy 65 percent, and the remaining 10 percent is reserved for promotion solely based on merit, determined through a limited competitive examination for civil judges. Judges who may not be senior in hierarchy can take the exams in the third mode of recruitment for a district judge’s post.
The petitioner argued that the High Court’s directive, outlining the selection criteria for in-house candidates, was discriminatory. It was highlighted that while in the 65 percent quota, candidates were required to achieve 50 percent separately in both the suitability test and the viva voce to be deemed eligible, no such individual minimum cut-off requirement existed for in-service candidates vying for promotion to a district judge’s position through the limited competitive examination.
